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Abstract—In a macro-economic system, all major sectors:
agriculture, extraction of natural resources, manufacturing, con-
struction, transport, communication and health services, are
dependent on a reliable supply of electricity. Targeted attacks
on power networks can lead to disruption in operations, causing
significant economic and social losses. When cyber networks in
power system are compromised, time-critical data can be dropped
and modified, which can impede real time operations and decision
making. This paper tracks the progress of research in power
system cyber security over the last decade and presents a tax-
onomy of data attacks. Nineteen different attack models against
major operation and control blocks are classified into four areas:
steady state control, transient and auxiliary control, substation
control and load control. For each class, a comprehensive review
of mathematical attack models is presented. The goal is to provide
a theoretically balanced approach to cyber attacks and their
impacts on the reliable functioning of the electric grid.
Index Terms—cybersecurity, data attacks, smart grids
I. INTRODUCTION
The last few years have seen a surge in the number of cyber
attacks emerging against industrial control systems. Examples
include (a) ‘Industroyer’, a malware that targeted switches,
breakers and substation communication protocols, and was
chiefly responsible for Ukraine’s power grid failure [1], [2],
(b) ‘Dragonfly’, which allowed attackers to gain unauthorized
control of critical systems [3], (c) ‘WannaCry’, that affected
operations of hospitals, banks and universities [4], [5], (d)
‘Stuxnet’, which gained control of nuclear facilities [6]–[8],
(e) ‘BlackEnergy’, designed to launch denial-of-service attacks
against SCADA applications in industrial control systems
[9] and (f) Trisis [10], a malware that attacked equipment
used in energy, oil and gas control system. These threats
result in substantial economic and social losses, and pose a
significant challenge to the operation of time-critical systems
like electric grids. This ushers in a rising need to understand
attack models and their impacts if utilities are going to
adopt preventive cyber-security schemes to protect critical
infrastructures against data attacks.
Data attacks are defined as injection, alteration, blocking,
deletion, modification of data or a combination of any of
the above, in devices or in communication network channels,
that impede the reliable operation of power systems. Such
attacks can be either packet data injection attacks, denial
of service attacks or time synchronization attacks launched
through malwares, viruses, ransom-wares, fraudulent emails
and social engineering [11].
In this paper, a taxonomy is developed that classifies nine-
teen data attack models against four operation and control
blocks of power system: (a) steady state control, (b) tran-
sient and auxiliary control, (c) substation control and (d)
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energy/load control, as shown in Fig 1. Operation of control
blocks and monitoring units susceptible to data attacks are
first described. This is followed by discussion of mathematical
attack models. Finally, the impacts of cyber threats on the
physical grids are highlighted. In short, this paper brings
together various research on data attack designs against power
system components under one umbrella.
Some of the major steady state algorithms in power systems
affected by data breaches include static state estimation (SSE),
dynamic state estimation (DSE), optimal power flow (OPF)
and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Such
data attacks involve load measurement redistribution, topology
falsification or a coordination of physical attacks augmented
with false data. Apart from steady state operations, transient
and auxiliary control blocks such as rotor angle stability,
automatic generation control (AGC), automatic voltage con-
trol (AVR), volt/VAR controls and FACTS devices are also
vulnerable to data attacks. Additionally, substation control and
communication architecture like IEC 61850, PMU/SCADA
data communication channels can also become potential attack
targets. Other targets include advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI), residential load controls, distributed energy routing
algorithms, micro-girds and electricity markets.
All the above components require continuous field mea-
surements. Attacks launched against any of these systems
can potentially introduce delays and errors in time-critical
operations. Without correct real-time information, the power
grid is susceptible to human errors. Falsified data results in
incorrect solutions to critical power system control algorithms.
This leads to increase in operation costs, incorrect generation
dispatch, erroneous load shedding and even, widespread black-
outs. Blackouts due to cyber attacks disrupt dependant water,
gas and the internet networks, affecting a large number of
customers and causing substantial monetary loss.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, technical documents and surveys related to power system
cyber-security are reviewed. Section III provides an overview
of various smart grid control operation blocks. Section IV
outlines the consequences of attacks on steady state operations.
Discussions on vulnerabilities affecting transient and auxiliary
control are presented in Section V. In Section VI, data attacks
against substation architecture are highlighted while Section
VII discusses consequences of energy alteration attacks. This
is followed by a discussion section that highlights key simi-
larities between different attack models, explores global cyber
security standards and identifies future research directions.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
There has been much deliberation and investigation in areas
of power systems and cyber security in the last couple of years.
In this section, information from multiple official reports,
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Fig. 1: A taxonomy of data falsification attacks against various power system control and operation blocks
guidelines and academic papers is concisely presented. Table
I compiles all major resources in this area of research.
In 2009, Sandia National Laboratories issued a report on
cyber attacks against electric power systems [12]. This case
study investigated attack impacts on the dynamic behavior
of the grid using a finite state abstraction model. A three-
volume report on implementation, design, operation, mainte-
nance and mitigation of cyber-related issues was presented
by NISTIR-7628 in 2010 [13]. In 2011, NERC published
the requirements of critical infrastructure protection (CIP).
This specifically aimed to highlight high, medium and low
impact cyber threats on bulk electric system components such
as control centres, substations, generation resources, remedial
schemes and switching [14]. The Cyber Attack Task Force, in
2012, published a report on coordinated attacks that resulted
in unnecessary circuit breaker operation, loss of load and
generation, communication system disruption and cascading
failures and proposed possible mitigation strategies [15]. The
findings of this Task Force were influenced by a 2010 report
[16]. In 2015, [17] emphasized the need for additional financial
and manpower investments to curb cyber vulnerabilities in
bulk power systems. It looked into potential attackable areas
in electric grids not covered under NERC CIP standards.
Other key findings and reports include the Cyber Threat and
Vulnerability Analysis that highlighted challenges to reliable
operation of the grid and proposed best practices to utilities
[18]. A 2018 report [19] provides a broader perspective on
threats against energy systems, highlights current practices
for cyber-physical security and recommends best mitigation
practices.
In general, such best practices include developing and
maintaining a secured network infrastructure, installation of
firewalls and using updated antivirus software. Others in-
clude encryption of data, patch management, setting strong
passwords, intrusion detection using deep packet inspection,
storage of data for future analysis, use of secure application
control software, purchasing equipment from reliable vendors,
restricting physical access, employee training and organization
wide cyber-security framework with an overall risk manage-
ment plan.
Apart from organizational findings and recommendations, a
vast amount of research on cyber-security vulnerabilities and
mitigation strategies have been published in academic journals.
Authors in [20] have presented a thorough review of smart
grid communication infrastructures and related cyber threats
and challenges. Vulnerable access points in the SCADA/EMS
architecture include: field staff remote access computers, local
LAN switches, modems connecting Remote Terminal Units
and SCADA/EMS Master, bridge/routers connecting to the
Wide Area Network and station HMIs linked to protection
relays [21]. Attacks exploiting these vulnerable access points
include Distributed Denial of Service, reconnaissance, scan-
ning, exploitation and access attacks that are often carried out
through malwares and viruses. Such attacks can spoof electric-
ity prices, alter meter data and falsify control commands [23],
[24]. To minimize cyber attack impacts, the requirements for
privacy, availability, integrity and authentication for SCADA
communication networks are summarized in [22]. Encryption
techniques, key management issues and security and privacy
threats against smart meters, electric vehicles, distributed gen-
erations are highlighted in [25]–[27], [32]–[34].
On the other hand, [28]–[31] discusses attacks on the
physical side of the grid. A qualitative survey of cyber attacks
on various control loops in power systems is presented in
[28]. Attacks and impacts on real cyber-physical test beds
are demonstrated in [29] while bad data injections and their
3TABLE I: Major Resources and References for Data Injection Attacks [2009 - 2019]
Resources and Areas References
Government and
Not-for-profit organization reports
National Laboratories [12], [18], NISTIR [13], NERC [14], [15], DOE [16],
Congressional Research Service [17], MITRE Corporation [19]
Smart grid communication Data communication architecture [20]–[27]
Other Surveys Control loops [28], Cyber-physical test beds [29], Security, safety and monitoring challenges [30]–[34], Stateestimation, AGC and electricity markets [35]–[37]
Steady State Control
Static State Estimation [38]–[46], Dynamic State Estimation [47], Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow [48],
Economic Dispatch [49], Load Redistribution [50]–[59], Topology Falsification [60]–[62]
Coordinated Attacks [63], [64]
Transient and Auxiliary Control Rotor Angle Stability [65], Automatic Generation Control [66]–[68], Automatic Voltage/VAR Control [69], [70]FACTS devices [71]
Substation Control PMUs [72]–[75] IEC 61850 [76], [77] Switching Attacks [78]
Energy Alteration Attack AMI [79]–[82], Residential Load Control [83], Distributed Energy Routing [84], Micro-grids [85]–[87]Electricity Markets [88], [89]
countermeasures are analyzed in [30], [31].
All the aforementioned resources delineate the growing cy-
ber threats against energy grids. It thus necessary to categorize
the various scattered information into a single taxonomy of
data attacks, shown in Fig. 1. All attempts have been made to
include as many major resources as possible. While authors
in [35]–[37] discussed quantitative attack models on state esti-
mation, AGC and electricity markets, a large section of power
system components vulnerable to attacks were overlooked.
This paper presents a taxonomy that classifies nineteen dif-
ferent attack models into four broad areas, and hence, is more
comprehensive. Besides, each attack scenario is supplemented
with concise and necessary mathematical details, much of
which have been omitted from previous surveys and reports
in the literature. Additionally, the chronological development
of cyber attack design is tracked, as presented in Fig. 2. The
overall intention of this paper is to highlight advanced cyber
attack designs and their possible impacts on the grid. This
can serve as a common platform to operators, researchers and
stakeholders in both power system and cyber security domains.
III. CONTROL AND OPERATION OF POWER SYSTEM
In this section, a brief review on key smart grid control
operations is presented. At the heart of the system is the master
program called the Energy Management Systems (EMS), a
high performance critical control system overlooking all mon-
itoring, control and optimization functions. Inside the EMS
is the state estimator (SE) program which collects redundant
measurements from various SCADA and PMU devices, elim-
inates gross data, and estimates bus voltages and angles using
a non-linear weighted least squares method [92]. SE provides
a quasi-static model of the power system under real-time
operating conditions using PMU and traditional measurements.
The output of SE is used as the basis for the critical applica-
tions in EMS including power-flow and economic dispatch,
load forecast, voltage security, transient and small signal
stability, real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and steady
state remedial action schemes (RAS).
Other services and control blocks include (a) AGC re-
sponsible for maintaining system wide frequency by regu-
lating power output of generators and reducing area control
error [93], (b) maintaining generation reserves to ensure re-
liability in the event of generation loss and (c) performing
transfer and contingency analysis. Transfer analysis helps
determine the extent by which the current operating system
can be moved before being bounded by security limit vio-
lations. Once transfers between different areas are identified,
system operators perform N − 1 or N − 1 − 1 contingency
analysis to secure the system under any real time operating
conditions [94]. After a contingency has occurred, transient
stability program plays a central role in regulating synchronous
generator load angles within acceptable limits at a short period
of time [95]. Ancillary services help preserve transmission
balance by maintaining spinning and non-spinning reserves
and managing load regulation and voltage support [96], [97].
Volt-Var compensation techniques ensure that the voltages and
reactive power remain within their desired limits during both
normal or emergency conditions [98]. Fault location, isolation,
and service restoration (FLISR) is another important control
block used to analyze, isolate faults and help restore services
[99], [100]. FLISR often employs time synchronized phasor
measurements for a more accurate estimation of fault location.
To safeguard the system against cascading failure after a major
fault, controlled islanding techniques partition the system
into smaller self-sufficient micro-grids with minimum load
generation imbalance. For more accurate real-time analysis of
the grid, utilities often deploy redundant measurement devices.
Such redundant systems include multiple voltage, current,
injection and flow measurements from different substations
across the network, redundant generations, parallel substation
communication architecture, backup protective relays, SCADA
computers, logs and databases [101], [102].
All the above sensors, which monitor real time measure-
ments and are responsible for time-critical operations, are
susceptible to cyber attacks. Data falsification can result in
inaccurate solutions for different control blocks, leading to
incorrect operator decisions, uneconomic dispatch, load shed-
ding or large scale power outages. The rest of the paper focuses
on the mathematical modeling and impact assessment of data
falsification attacks against four control operation blocks: (a)
steady state control, (b) transient and auxiliary control, (c)
substation control and (d) energy/load control.
IV. ATTACKS ON STEADY STATE CONTROL
In this section, cyber attacks against various steady state
control blocks are considered. These blocks include state
estimation, optimal power flow and economic dispatch. The
structure of EMS and associated operator actions are shown
42009
FDIA DC SE [39]
2010
FDIA Locational Marginal Price [88]
2011
PMU Code injection [75]
2011
Load Redistribution Attack [50]
2011
FDIA DC SE incomplete information [43]
2012
FDIA DC SE incomplete information [44]
2012
FDIA AC SE [41]
2012
FDIA Distributed Energy Routing [84]
2013
Topology Attacks [61]
2013
PMU GPS Time Sync Attack [72]
2014
Load Redistribution incomplete information [52]
2014
Attack against AGC [66]
2014
Data Attack volt/VAR control [70]
2014
IEC61850 Attacks [76]
2014
Switching Attacks [78]
2015
FDIA AMI [80]
2015
FDIA Residential Load Control [83]
2015
FDIA Microgrid Partition [85]
2016
FDIA + Topology Attacks [60]
2016
Co-oridnated Attacks [63]
2016
PMU Packet Drop Attack [73]
2016
FDIA Multistep Electricity price [89]
2017
FDIA AC SE incomplete information [42]
2017
FDIA Dynamic SE [47], [90]
2017
FDIA Security Constrained OPF [48]
2017
FDIA Economic Dispatch [49]
2017
FDIA Rotor Angle Stability [65]
2017
FDIA Automatic Generation Control [68]
2018
FDIA Automatic Voltage Control [69]
2018
DoS Attack Mircogrid [87]
2018
FDIA FACTS devices [71]
2019
FDIA Microgrid Distributed Load Sharing [91]
Fig. 2: Chronology of benchmark papers in cyber attack design and impact on power systems [2009-2019]
in Fig. 3. Attacks involve data and topology falsification at
the device level with the objective to alter the solution of
the control algorithms. Incorrect solutions can induce line
overloads that can lead to unwanted tripping, increase in
generation costs and in the worst case, extensive power failure.
A. Static State Estimation
Static state estimation provides quasi-real-time voltage mag-
nitude and phase angle at each bus of the network under real-
time operating conditions. The states are estimated by solving
an over-determined solution of non-linear power flow equa-
tions using measurements obtained from traditional SCADA
meters and PMUs [103].
General assumptions to carry out successful attacks include
(1) availability of complete or partial system topology and Ja-
cobian matrix, (2) non-attackable zero-injection buses, (3) non-
attackable generator measurements or attackable small dis-
tributed generators, (4) access to dynamic line limit monitoring
devices, meter measurements and meter ID mapping in EMS
and (5) available historical load, generation capacity, cost,
dispatch sequences and locational marginal price data [38]–
[41], [43]–[46], [49], [52], [64].
Attack against linear state estimation was first demonstrated
by Liu et al. [39]. Yang et al. extended [39] to find sparsest
attack vectors that caused maximum deviation in the estimated
states. To find such sparsest attack vectors, linear transfor-
mation of Jacobian matrix and heuristic approaches were
employed [40]. On the other hand, FDIA against non-linear
AC state estimator were investigated by Hug et al. in [41].
With complete system information available to the attackers,
authors in [41] proposed to inject attack vectors such that (a)
the injected attack vector satisfy KCL at each node and (b)
the residual of the altered SE is below the set threshold,
∥∥zbad − h(xˆ2bad)∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥( z1z2bad
)
−
(
h(xˆ1)
h(xˆ2bad)
)∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥( z1z2 + a
)
−
(
h(xˆ1)
h(xˆ2 + c)
)∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥(z1z2
)
−
(
h(xˆ1)
h(xˆ2)
)∥∥∥∥ < τ
(1)
Here, the measurement set z divided into either those that are
compromised (z2) or those that are not (z1), a is the attack
vector, c is the bias added to the original states and h is the
set of non-linear power flow equations relating the states to
the measurements. The attack vector can then be constructed
as a = h(xˆ2 + c)− h(xˆ2).
The assumption that complete network information is avail-
able with attackers was challenged by authors in [42]–[45].
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The feasibility of FDIA under incomplete information of
circuit breaker status, transformer taps, network connectivity
matrix and admittance matrix was established by Rahman et
al. [44]. In case of partial network information, authors in [42]
proposed the following optimization problem to construct
FDIA vectors,
minimize
10∑
i=1
1TSi
subject to

∆P
∆Q
∆p
∆q
∆V
 =

∂P/∂V ∂P/∂δ
∂Q/∂V ∂Q/∂δ
∂p/∂V ∂p/∂δ
∂q/∂V ∂q/∂δ
1 0

[
∆V
∆θ
]
Pmin ≤ P + ∆P + S1 − S2 ≤ Pmax
pmin ≤ p+ ∆p+ S3 − S4 ≤ pmax
qmin ≤ q + ∆q + S5 − S6 ≤ qmax
V min ≤ V + ∆V + S7 − S8 ≤ V max
δmin ≤ G(δ + ∆δ) + S9 − S10 ≤ δmax
(2)
Here, P,Q, p, q are bus active and reactive power injections
and line flows respectively, V is bus voltages, G is the
transition matrix transforming bus voltage angles θ into line
angle differences and Si are slack variables. The new attack
vector can be updated as [V δ]T = [V δ]T + [∆V ∆δ]T .
Other approaches include those by Esmalifalak et al. [43]
where topology and states were inferred from power flow
measurements using independent component analysis. General
blind FDIA was introduced by Yu and Chin [45] where an
approximation of Jacobian matrix was obtained using principal
component analysis. Such approximated attack vectors were
proved to be almost stealthy.
With many time-critical control blocks in power systems
depending on the SE output, a direct attack targeting the
SE solution will interfere with the real time operation and
control of the grid. Data falsification will lead to incorrect
state estimation, mislead power flow solutions, resulting in
incorrect line tripping, unwanted re-dispatch of generation, or
in the worst case, load shedding and cascades.
B. Dynamic State Estimation
There are two major drawbacks of the traditional state
estimator: (1) it fails to capture the dynamics of the power
system due to continuous random load fluctuations and gener-
ation adjustments, (2) slow convergence and large computation
power is involved in estimating states at short intervals for
large networks. The above two drawbacks are addressed by
the dynamic SE [104]. Dynamic SE are faster and are able to
predict the future states at t+ 1 time using the knowledge of
the system at tth time step. The process of dynamic SE are
summarized through the two equations, xt+1 = F (t)x(t) +
G(t) + w(t) and zt+1 = h(x(t + 1)) + e(t + 1). Here, x
refers to the estimated states, F is the state transition matrix,
G is the state trajectory vector, w is the Gaussian noise added
to the signal, z is the set of measurements linking the non-
linear power flow equations h to the states and e is Gaussian
measurement noise. Authors in [47], [90] have investigated
attacks against dynamic SE. A successful attack vector a was
constructed as,
||a(k + 1) + h(xˆ(k + 1))− h(xˆa(k + 1))|| ≤  (3)
where τ is the maximum tolerance of error of the estimator
and 0 ≤  ≤ τ . Such false data injection introduces bias in
specific states, which can further corrupt power flow and other
control algorithms similar to attack on traditional SE.
C. Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow
After estimating the states, optimal power flow is solved
to find transmission line power flows. This is done by power
6flow algorithms which solve a set of non-linear power balance
(generation, load and network) equations [95]. An extension
of the optimal power flow solution is the security constrained
optimum power flow (SCOPF). SCOPF has added constraints
for generator power limits, transmission line capacity and
contingency constraints that ensure the system is both pre-
contingency and post-contingency stable with no limit viola-
tions [105]–[107].
Falsified state estimates result in incorrect SCOPF solutions,
jeopardizing real-time reliability of the grid. A direct attack
on the SCOPF algorithm for a DC powerflow model was dis-
cussed by Khanna et al. [48]. A bi-level optimization problem
was formulated where an attacker falsified load measurements
by compromising minimum number of meters. The objective
was to alter generation dispatch such that the system becomes
susceptible to a single point failure. The outer optimization
problem was formulated as,
Min
∆PD
∑
∀d∈ND
Ld + 2
∑
∀l∈NL
FLl (4)
Here, Ld is a binary variable which is one if there is a change
in the load measurement at bus d ∈ ND, and FLl is another
binary variable indicating changes in the flow measurement
∆PD of transmission line l ∈ NL. The objective minimizes the
number of meters compromised with the following constraints:
(a) changes in measurements were confined within tolerable
limits, (b) net load in the system was kept unchanged, (c)
altered line flows were below line limits and (d) that the
new dispatch was not N − 1 compliant. The system failure
was guaranteed by ensuring that there exists line overloads
following a single line disconnection with the new dispatch.
The inner level of the optimization is the SCOPF with the
perturbed measurements to obtain the new dispatch Pg ,
Pg = arg {minPg
∑
i∈NG
CgiPgi} (5)
where Cgi is the cost associated with dispatch Pgi. The
outer level optimization was solved through meta-heuristic
techniques while quadrature programming was employed to
solve the inner level problem. Feasible attacks led to mis-
operation, resulting in multiple line trips following a single
line outage. Attacks against SCOPF also result in misleading
Automatic Voltage Regulators (AVC), details of which are
described in Section V-C.
D. Economic Dispatch
The economic dispatch algorithm is solved periodically by
system operators to balance load and demand at the lowest op-
erating cost, subjected to transmission and generation capacity
constraints [108], [109]. The output of economic dispatch is
heavily dependant on the SE solutions [110].
Authors in [49] propose a linear-quadratic bi-level opti-
mization considering data attacks on the economic dispatch
algorithm. The main aim of the attacker is to alter power
flows and congest critical lines in the network. The attackers
first adjust the dynamic line ratings (DLR) of transmission
lines (equipped with dynamic line limit monitoring devices)
to maximize line flow fij violations,
Max
i,j∈ED
100
(
|fij |
udi,j
− 1
)
(6)
Here, udi,j and u
a are the correct and falsified DLR. Assump-
tions include attackers ability to alter dynamic line ratings,
prior knowledge of system topology, nodal power injections,
generator capacities, transmission line limits and generation
costs. On the other hand, the operator minimizes operation
cost Ci with the falsified measurements for a dispatch pi,
Min C(p) =
∑
i∈G
Ci(pi) (7)
The optimization problem was subjected to power flow con-
straints, load-generation constraints and flow capacity con-
straints. The linear-quadratic bilevel optimization was refor-
mulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) using
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the lower level
problem. Crafted attack against the economic dispatch algo-
rithm can result in increase operation costs, line overloads and
subsequent line tripping and further aggravating the risks of
cascading failures.
An extension of the economic dispatch problem is the
security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) [111], [112].
SCED minimizes operating costs to meet customer demands
while ensuring transmission line capacities are not violated
following any contingency [113], [114]. Authors in [50] have
formulated attacks against SCED as load redistribution attacks
that modify load measurements at different buses, which are
considered next.
E. Load Redistribution Attacks
Load Redistribution (LR) attack is a class of false data
injection attacks that aims to compromise the SE and
SCED/SCOPF by falsifying load measurements [50]–[59]. In
LR attacks, load injections measurements are increased at
certain buses and decreased at other buses keeping total load
unchanged and altering corresponding power flow measure-
ments so that KCL holds at every node.
Yuan et al. identified FDIA as LR attacks [50]. Such attacks
were carried out by changing load measurements up to 50% of
their original set point, leading to a secure operating condition
with higher operation costs. The LR attack problem was
formulated as a bi-level optimization problem. With the total
generation cost as cgPg , load shedding cost as csdSd, load
shedding amount as Sd altered load as ∆D, load alteration
tolerance as τ , shift factor matrix as SF and bus load incidence
matrix as KD, the upper level problem aimed to maximize
generation and load-shedding costs,
7max∆D
Ng∑
g=1
cgP
∗
g +
Nd∑
d=1
csdS
∗
d
s.t.
Nd∑
d=1
∆Dd = 0
− τDd ≤ ∆Dd ≤ τDd
∆PL = −SF.KD.∆D
(8)
The optimization problem was subjected to other logical,
resource and SCED constraints. It also ensured that total
load demand remained unchanged and that load measurements
were varied within specific tolerance. The system operator on
the other hand minimizes operation cost by re-dispatching
generation or by shedding loads. The operator actions are
based on falsified states obtained after an incorrect SE solution.
The SCED for the operator’s side was formulated as,
{Pg, Sd} = arg{Min
Ng∑
g=1
cgPg +
Nd∑
d=1
csdSd} (9)
The authors transformed the bi-level problem to an equivalent
single level problem using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions to obtain the optimal attack vector.
Authors in [51], [115] considered altered load measurements
not to exceed 50% of the original value and maximum com-
promised meters were limited to 20. The LR attack transferred
loads from multiple buses to the largest load bus in the system.
In [54], authors considered maximum 20% changes in the load
measurement. Authors in [55] carried LR attacks on 10, 15,
25, and 30 meters and load changes were subjected to normal
distribution with N(20, 100). Smaller set of attackable mea-
surements reflect limited attacker budget, thus more practical.
Additionally, feasibility of LR attack under partial network
information was considered by Liu et al. in [52], [53].
LR attacks were shown to increase operating costs by (a)
driving the SCED/SCOPF to uneconomic operating conditions
resulting in non-optimal generation dispatch, (b) causing load
shedding and (c) initiating line overloads and tripping. If such
attacks are not discovered quickly, multiple overloaded line
trips can initiate widespread load-shedding in the absence of
immediate corrective actions.
F. Topology Falsification Attacks
For reliable operation of the power system, it is crucial
for utilities to quickly identify outaged lines. This is done
by topology processor that estimates current system topology
from circuit breaker contact signals hardwired to Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs) prior to each cycle of SE. Under
normal condition, authors in [60] explain that line outage
residuals are good indices to identify disconnected lines.
When kth line is out of service, the residual is given as,
rk = minf0k ||∆θm,k − ∆θcalm,k||2. Here, ∆θm,k and ∆θcalm,k
are the observed and calculated phase angle changes observed
by PMU.
In [60], it was demonstrated that line outage residuals are
potential candidates for successful attacks. After altering the
line open status from 0 to 1 in the PMU packet data, the
attackers need to falsify injection measurements at both end
of the candidate transmission line. Two conditions are needed
to lauch successful attacks: (1) the line outage residuals of
the attacked line should be above a minimum threshold and
(2) attacks should satisfy both KCL and KVL to successfully
pass the existing bad data detection system in the SE. The
ultimate goal of such attacks is to mask line outages by sending
a combination of incorrect status and altered measurements
to the control center. A bi-level optimization problem was
proposed where in the upper level problem, the attacker
maximizes the candidate line residual above the minimum
threshold,
Max minf0k ||∆θm,k −∆θ
cal
m,k|| (10)
The objective function is constrained to load injection and
power flow measurement alteration within tolerable ranges
while ensuring that the total injected load remains unchanged.
For the lower level problem, the operator aims to minimize
the residuals,
Min minf0k ||∆θm,k −∆θ
cal
m,k|| (11)
When the attacker modifies power injection and line flow
measurements, the value of ∆θcalm,k changes to ∆θ
′cal
m,k. The
above bi-level problem was re-formulated as a single level
problem. The single level problem was non-convex and was
written as two linear programs. Load injection measurement
variations were kept within 50% the rated values. Other
approaches to topology attacks include falsifying of circuit
breaker status [61], [62].
The consequences of topology attacks can be understood
straightforward: when line outages are masked and system
topology is incorrect, observability analysis, state estimation
and bad data detection fails resulting in erroneous line flows.
This directly affects critical control programs like SCED,
SCOPF and RTCA.
G. Coordinated Attacks
Coordinated attacks on the other hand are the worst kind of
attacks that combine FDIA, LR and topology falsification, as
shown in Fig. 4. These attacks were considered by authors
in [63], [64]. Li et al. formulated a bi-level optimization
problem where coordinated attacks were launched to mask line
outages [63]. Deng et al. in [64] combined physical attacks
(designed as altered power flow measurements) with carefully
constructed false data injection.
A bi-level mixed-integer program was proposed in [63].
Here, the upper level optimization maximized the impacts of
physical attacks while the lower level optimization minimized
attack costs by finding an optimal set of measurements to be
altered,
Upper Level: maximize
∑
l∈L
[|∆PL(1)l |.(1− wl)] (12)
Lower Level: minimize
∑
i∈B
cB,i.δB,i +
∑
l∈L
cL,l.δL,l (13)
8Fig. 4: Coordinated attacks and consequences: (a) healthy power
system, (b) line 3-4 physical outage coordinated with alteration of
node injection measurements at 3 and 4, (c) falsification of power
flow and injection measurements in attack neighborhood surrounded
by injection buses, resulting in (d) line 3-5 physical overload.
Here, ∆PL(1)l is the change in line flows after physical attack,
cB,i, cL,l are resources needed to alter bus and line measure-
ments and wl, δB,i, δL,l are binary variables. The optimization
problem was subjected to budget, connectivity, topology, load
redistribution, line limits and logical constraints [63]. The
mixed-integer nonlinear program was reformulated as a mixed-
integer linear program. However, due to non-convexity of the
lower level problem, KKT or duality based methods could not
be used, and a two-stage sequential approach was proposed.
Coordinated attacks were shown to result in multiple line
overloads, unintended islanding and cascading failures.
V. ATTACKS ON TRANSIENT AND AUXILIARY CONTROL
In addition to steady state algorithms, transient and auxiliary
control algorithms can also become subjected to targeted
data attacks. These control algorithms oversee both local and
global stability of the system under transient disturbances.
Crafted attacks against these transient control blocks result
in generator speed deviations leading to global synchronism
loss and transmission line trips, thereby driving the system
into states of emergency. Attacks against auxiliary controls can
inhibit power transfer capability, interfere with voltage limit
and power quality control.
A. Rotor Angle Stability
Transient stability monitoring is a critical real-time power
system control block that ensures synchronous generator load
angles return to a steady state within a few cycles following
a disturbance [95], [116]. This is done by various external
control mechanisms that are capable of controlling injected
power in a short period of time. One such system is a
decentralized external storage which is responsible for quickly
injecting/absorbing power to/from the network after a fault.
Authors in [65] investigated false data attacks against such
storage devices and studied their impacts on rotor speed and
angle. Data attacks against rotor speed of the generator w.r.t
synchronous speed θ, accelerating power of generator PA and
rotor angle δ are formulated as,
θˆi(t) = θi(t) + fθi(t)
PˆAi(t) = PAi(t) + fPi(t)
δˆi(t) = δi(t) + fδi(t)
(14)
where the attack signals are defined as,
fθi(t) = i1θi(t) + κi1(t) + µi1
fPi(t) = i2PAi(t) + κi2(t) + µi2
fδi(t) = i3δi(t) + κi3(t) + µi3
(15)
Here , κ, µ are attack variables which control magnification,
additive and bias components in the attack signal. When
data is forged, the transient stability control may fail to
maintain balance between electrical and mechanical torques
after a major fault. This will cause rotor angle and speed to
deviate from the desired set points, subsequently disconnecting
generators from the grid and introducing shocks to the system.
B. Automatic Generation Control
Automatic generation control is another fundamental con-
trol block in power system whose objective is to maintain
a nominal grid frequency [93], [117]. The IEEE standard
[118] defines the function of AGC as, “the regulation of the
power output of electric generators within a prescribed area in
response to changes in system frequency, tie-line loading, or
the relation of these to each other."
Investigations in [66] have demonstrated attack impacts on
AGC due to signal magnifications and random packet delays.
With the original measurement set y(t), a scaling parameter
λs was used to alter the measurements,
y′(t) = (1 + λs) ∗ y(t) (16)
In another case, a ramping parameter λr was used to gradually
alter the measurements as,
y′(t) = y(t) + λr ∗ t (17)
In both the cases, the corrupt measurements indicated an
excess of power generation in one area. This lead to an
incorrect AGC action to ramp down generation, eventually
leading to frequency decay and load shedding. In [67], a
cyber security test bed was used to demonstrate tie-line and
frequency measurement alteration that led to increase in area
control error.
In [68], authors have illustrated data injection attacks tar-
geted at AGC through a closed-form Laplace domain model.
It was shown how an attacker was able to snoop on sensor
data, gather knowledge about generation inertia and load
damping parameters, and then use linear regression-based
learning techniques to extract the required attack model. The
input-output relationship of the AGC in terms of load change
∆p, attack vector a and frequency deviation ∆w is given by,
∆ˆw = θTΦ−1∆ˆp+ θTΦ−1ΛΨT aˆ (18)
9where Λ and θTΦ−1 are the second and fourth order polyno-
mial fractions of the Laplace variable, T is a matrix aggregat-
ing real-tie line flows into virtual tie-lines and Φ represents
generator transfer function expressions. Based on eq (18), the
attack vector in the kth AGC cycle was proposed as,
∆w(k) =
H−1∑
h=0
uTh∆pk−h + v
T
h Tak−h (19)
where H is the regression horizon and u and h represent
θTΦ−1 and θTΦ−1ΛΨ respectively. Detailed description on
all variables can be found in [68].
Sequential attacks targeting the AGC result in frequency
deviation from the nominal set point. This can lead to mis-
operation of remedial action schemes, disconnect generators
and loads and damage expensive equipment, eventually trig-
gering cascading failures.
C. Automatic Voltage Control and Volt-VAR Control
Automatic Voltage Control block maintains system voltages
within desired range through reactive power injections and is
commonly used to monitor inter-area reactive power balances
[96], [119]. AVC is highly dependent on the results of the SE.
The operation of AVC can be briefly explained as follows:
first, the output of the SE (voltages and angles) are fed as
an input to the OPF. Once the OPF converges to a valid
solution, the outputs are used to issue commands to generators
triggering them to vary their output reactive power to maintain
voltage within its prescribed margin. AVC aims to change
active and reactive power by minimizing line losses and can
be formulated as,
c(t) = arg min {
∑
PG(t)−
∑
PL(t)} (20)
where PG(t) and PL(t) are active power generation and
consumption respectively and c(t) denotes optimal regulations
of power generations [69]. The above optimization problem is
subjected to all physical power system constraints.
Authors in [69] investigated how falsified data can distort
the functioning of the AVC leading to bus voltage violations at
compromised substations. Such attacks send erroneous active
and reactive power information to the dispatch centers trigger-
ing incorrect generator actions. The problem was formulated
as a Partial Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP).
The process of constructing a successful attack against AVC
can be described as follows: first, the attacker changes active
and reactive power measurements from z to zˆ, which results
in incorrect state estimation. The incorrect solution is fed
to the OPF program whose outputs trigger changes in the
voltage regulation commands. When carried out during peak
load hours can adversely affect closed-loop control systems
required to maintain voltage stability and power balance. In
the worst case, falsified measurements can also lead to system-
wide outages. Further investigations on attacks at both ends
of the line in a substation resulted in a total voltage collapse.
Volt-VAR control is another important control block ensur-
ing that voltages at each point along the distribution feeder is
maintained within the acceptable range of 0.95 p.u. to 1.05
p.u [98], [120]. Transformer load tap changers are used to
maintain the voltage level while capacitor banks are used to
control the reactive power. In a distribution network, consumer
current loads Iij (denoted as the unknown state y) and feeder
voltages v0 are modeled as,[
vk − vk0f1(Ck)
(Sk/vk0 )
∗ − vk0f2(Ck)
]
=
[
Hv(Ck)
HS(Ck)
]
y (21)
where S is the complex power, fi are scaling for capacitor
bank arrangement C and Hv and HS are obtained from KVL
equations [70].
Authors in [70] studied the feasibility of such attacks under
different capacitor bank configurations. False data injected
caused the Volt/VAR controls to issue incorrect commands to
load tap changes and capacitor banks, which in turn increased
the voltage level from v to v + a. The new state description
becomes,[
vk + a− vk0f1(Ck)
(Sk/vk0 )
∗ − vk0f2(Ck)
]
=
[
Hv(Ck)
HS(Ck)
]
(y + ∆y) (22)
It was found that for a successful attack under all possible
capacitor configurations, the attack vector can be constructed
as a = Hv(C1)Bcα resulting in state bias ∆y = Bcα.
Falsified data increase system operating costs and disrupt the
normal operations of Volt/VAR control by making it unable to
bring back voltages to desired set points.
D. FACTS Devices
FACTS devices are power electronic based solutions used
to improve the controllability and power transfer capability
in power systems [121]. These thyristor controlled devices
are used to to manage active and reactive power and have
a superior performance over traditional shunt capacitors and
reactors. For a network, the terminal power measurements can
be written as [71],
Pk =
−VkVmsin(θk − θm)
XTCSC
(23)
Qk =
−V 2k + VkVmcos(θk − θm)
XTCSC
(24)
where XTCSC is the equivalent reactance of the TCSC,
P,Q, V, θ are active, reactive power, bus voltage and angle
respectively.
Authors in [71] have studied the impacts of false data
injection on two FACTS devices: thyristor controlled series
compensator (TCSC) and static VAR compensator. It was
shown that falsified data at SCADA and PMU level alter
system state variables, which in turn produce corrupt active
and reactive power measurements at the TCSC terminal trig-
gering incorrect control actions from the device. For attacks
on static VAR, power injections at the terminal of the coupling
transformer were altered to produce an incorrect firing angle.
In both the cases, falsified data either drove the TCSC to
operate very close to the resonance point or triggered the static
VAR compensator to provide incorrect reactive power support.
Such attacks have the potential to disturb the current operat-
ing conditions of the grid and physically damage expensive
equipment.
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Fig. 5: Common local vulnerable points in a PMU-PDC network
VI. ATTACKS ON SUBSTATION CONTROL
In this section, crafted attacks against substation measure-
ment devices are discussed. These devices are responsible for
sampling voltage, current and power flows from instrument
transformers and relaying them to energy management system
and other control and protection blocks. Attacks carried out at
the device level are considered to be the most direct threats
that obstruct real-time data flow, making operators blind to
changes in the actual grid.
A. Phasor Measurement Units
Phasor measurement units, also known as synchrophasors,
are widely deployed by utilities to improve real-time moni-
toring of voltage, current and frequency [122], [123]. These
measurement units sample at the rate of 30/60/120 messages
per second with a significantly high degree of accuracy
compared to SCADA devices. PMUs at the substation level
send their measurements to a local phasor data concentrator
(PDC) where the data packets are time synchronized and
aligned. Data from station level PDCs are concentrated at
regional PDCs which further report to a centrally located
data concentrator at the main control center. Any attack on
the PMU-PDC architecture altering or blocking the flow of
data packets can significantly impede various mission critical
operations such as state estimation, real-time protection and
control algorithms that rely on continuous streaming data.
Various data attack models against PMU architecture have
been discussed in the literature [72]–[75]. Vulnerable points
in the PMU-PDC architecture is shown in Fig. 5.
The first type of data injection attack is the manipulation
of GPS time synchronization signal of the PMUs [72]. A
global time stamp is assigned to each and every measurement
sampled by the PMU. This enables operators to detect events,
analyze faults and their locations in real-time. Modifying
the time stamps associated with the PMU measurements is
equivalent to altering phase angle of buses,
θ′Vs = θVs + ∆θS (25)
θ′VR = θVR + ∆θR (26)
where θ′Vs and θ
′
Vs
are the modified sending and receiving end
voltage phase angles after biases ∆θS and ∆θR are added
to the original measurements. Such attacks can introduce
locational errors in the event of fault location, which is given
as,
∆D = D −D(∆θ) (27)
where D is the original fault location index and D(∆θ) is
the error introduced as a result of the attack. This signifi-
cantly affects the system recovery process under contingencies.
Modification of the phase angle measurements also result in
incorrect SE solutions. Additionally, when measurements at
both ends of the line are tampered, an attacker can mask line
outages. Incorrect topology results in falsified states affecting
SCED, SCOPF and RTCA.
Another type of vulnerability, called gray-hole attack, has
been addressed by authors in [73]. This kind of attack enable
an adversary to drop PMU packet data in the PMU-PDC com-
munication network. Three different metrics have been used to
distinguish data packet drops due to network congestion from
those dropped intentionally by an attacker: correlation metric,
loss conditioned delay correlation and delay cumulative distri-
bution function. The major impact of gray-hole attacks is the
disruption of real-time data packet transmission which may
result in topology errors and loss of measurements, ultimately
leading to incorrect operator decisions at the control center.
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Man-in-the-Middle attack against PMUs have been studied
by authors in [74]. Here, the operators are led to believe that
messages received at the control center are from a trusted
source. This kind of attack places the adversary between the
measurement devices and the control center, subsequently al-
lowing the attacker to modify PMU packet data. Another class
of attack is code injection attack where malicious codes are
inserted in the PMUs to add/delete/alter protection instructions
[75].
B. Threats Against IEC 61850
IEC 61850 was introduced as the international standard
for substation communication. It enables a simpler substation
architecture and introduces interoperability between various
commercially available protection and control devices [124],
[125]. This standard allows intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs) to communicate with each other through local Ethernet
using the Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE)
messages [126], [127].
It was shown by authors in [76], [77] that both the Ethernet
and the GOOSE messaging protocols were vulnerable to
data framing attacks. GOOSE messages exchanged between
different control and monitoring equipment were demonstrated
to be single point of failures vulnerable to attacks. These
attacks mainly include data packet modification where the
attackers can alter packet data contents over the LAN. Inten-
tionally modified GOOSE messages, when received by control
blocks, can disconnect circuit breakers, damage expensive field
equipment, de-energize substations and cause multiple line
outages.
C. Switching Attacks
In [78], authors have explored coordinated multi-switch
attacks. These attacks remotely corrupt circuit breaker control
signals through vulnerabilities in the communication networks.
A variable structure system theory approach was used to
study the behavior of power systems with switching dynamics.
Attacks force circuit breakers to open or close for a short-
duration that lead to transient destabilization of synchronous
generators. This triggers protection systems to trip attacked
generators. Three types of attacks were considered: single
switching, concurrent switching and progressive switching at-
tacks. The impacts of such attacks included loss of generation
synchronization and subsequent tripping, loss of loads and
uncontrolled cascades. A real world example of such an attack
demonstration can be found here [128].
VII. ENERGY ALTERATION ATTACKS
In this section, attacks altering energy consumption and
load forecast data are considered. These attacks forge meter
measurements to alter demand information across a specific
geographical area. Such attacks lead to incorrect operation of
energy consumption scheduling blocks, increase in electric-
ity prices for customers, incorrect micro-grid operations and
economic profits for attackers from electricity markets.
A. Advanced Metering Infrastructures
In smart grids, advanced metering infrastructures enable bi-
directional communication between customers and utilities.
AMI provides time-based information on electricity consump-
tion, outages and electricity prices [129], [130].
Authors in [79], [80] investigate false data attacks on smart
meters, which form the backbone of advanced metering infras-
tructure. These attacks include Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack that flood the meter communication network
rendering critical meters unavailable. On the other hand,
manipulation of smart meter data to claim higher energy export
in an area can be exploited for economic gains [81]. First,
an attack region Npri involving buses that are not directly
or indirectly connected to generators are identified. Once the
attacking region is identified, the attackers maximize power
injection at ith bus by solving the following optimization
problem,
Max
P
Npri
D ,PGi
{
Npri∑
l=1,l 6=i
−Bil(δl − δi)} (28)
where PD, PGi and δi are the demand, real power generation
and load angle at bus i and B is the bus susceptance matrix in
the primary attack region. The optimization problem is solved
while keeping altered load measurements within tolerable
limits and ensuring that measurements in non-attacking region
are not modified.
It can be perceived that attacks against AMI resemble
load redistribution attacks. Falsifying power consumption and
pricing data affect residential load controls, which further
influence upper level control blocks such as SCOPF or SCED,
as described in Section IV-C and IV-D. Moreover, when
attackers gain access to “remote disconnect” feature of the
smart meters, they can disconnect a large group of customers
causing widespread load shedding [82].
B. Residential Load Control
The energy consumption scheduling (ECS) and the residen-
tial load control systems are additional technologies that pave
the way for bi-directional communication between consumers
and distribution utilities [131], [132]. The ECS system gathers
customer consumption information and time-based electricity
price to schedule energy for each household at each time [133],
[134]. This allows utilities to reliably supply electricity to all
customers while minimizing cost of generated energy.
False data attack on the ECS and the residential load control
system lead to load alteration in the distribution grid, and
hence change the output of the energy scheduling system.
The problem of electricity price message fabrication has been
studied by authors in [83]. Two different indices have been
studied to assess the impact of such an attack.
The first index calculates the maximum number of
lines/nodes that can fail following a successful attack. With yij
= 1 in case of line disconnection, zi = 1 if ith demand node is
altered, D denoting the set demand nodes, (1+ki)B as billing
constraints, ri as the electricity billing rate and (ri − zi.ρi)
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as the reduction in user demand at node i, the optimization
problem was formulated as,
Max
∑
e(i,j)∈E
yij
s.t. (1 + ki)B ≥ Di.(ri − zi.ρi)∑
i∈D
ci(zi) ≤ A
yij ≤ fij − uij
uij
(29)
The first constraint represents changes in demand values in
billing calculation, the second constraint restricts the cost of
attacking resources within attacker budget A and the third con-
straint represents line disconnection. The optimization problem
is subjected to additional power flow constraints. In the second
index, the authors extended their work to study the failures of
centrally located nodes. Attacks are launched with minimum
cost burden on the attacker side while maximizing the potential
of cascading failures.
In both the indices, the impact of altering load mea-
surements has been quantified in terms of network stress,
maximum available attack resources and network resilience
to attacks. Such attacks at the consumer level can reflect
adversely on the bulk transmission system. Single line failures
may trigger additional line outages, which can eventually lead
to a large portion of grid without power. If the system is not
resilient enough, such attacks might lead to cascading failures
of critical edges and nodes.
C. Distributed Energy Routing
Given multiple demand and supply node information as
well as transmission line capacities, distributed energy routing
algorithm finds the most optimal routes to transfer power from
supply to demand nodes by minimizing the transmission costs
[135]. This optimization problem for DER can be formulated
as [135],
min cost =
1
2
.
∑
Lij∈L
(|Eij .Costij |)
s.t. ∀v ∈ NP ,
∑
i∈Nv
Evi ≤ Pv,
∀u ∈ ND,
∑
j∈Nu
Euj ≤ −Du,
∀Lij ∈ L,Eij = −Eji
(30)
where i and j are node numbers, Eij is the energy transmitted
at Costij through transmission line Lij ∈ L, where L is the
set of all lines, NP and ND are set of supply and demand
nodes, Nv and Nu are the neighboring nodes of supply node
v and demand node u, Du is the node u energy request and
Pv is the energy node v can provide.
Authors in [84] discuss data attacks against the distributed
energy routing in smart grids. This kind of attack aims to
manipulate demand and supply messages at different nodes.
Three different scenarios have been considered to understand
the impact of such attacks in terms of supplied energy loss,
transmission cost and number of node outages.
Under false energy data attack, the attacker falsifies node
demand or supply data. False energy data attacks can be further
classified into two types. In energy request deceiving attack,
an attacker sends out large quantity of falsified energy request
to different supply nodes. As the total energy supply is limited,
compromised nodes demanding more energy will lead to
other demand nodes not receiving their requested energy, and
hence result in outages. Moreover, since the distributed energy
routing algorithm is forced to re-route energy, it leads to
increase in electricity transmission cost. On the other hand, in
energy supply deceiving attack, an attacker claims to provide
additional or less energy than under normal circumstances.
This result in increase in transmission costs and broken links,
resulting in subsequent node outages as less nodes now receive
requested energy.
Under false link-state attack, the attacker falsifies the trans-
mission line state information. When out of service trans-
mission lines are claimed to be valid, the energy distribution
algorithm may assign power flow through these lines if they lie
in the shortest path between demand and supply nodes. As the
line is physically not able to carry energy, this would result in
nodes outages and lead to transmission disruption. When valid
lines are claimed to be invalid, the algorithm redirects energy
through other non-optimal lines, increasing transmission cost.
Claiming all lines to a node to be invalid results in further
node outages.
D. Micro-grids
Micro-grids are small self-sustainable power grids local
to communities or cities, which can disconnect from the
main grid when required and operate autonomously. These
micro-grids form self sufficient demand-supply systems often
with large penetration of distributed renewable energy sources
[136], [137]. As micro-grids can operate independently, they
strengthen grid resiliency at time of major contingencies.
Authors in [85] investigate three different types of false
data injection attacks affecting micro-grid partition. In such
attacks, the attacker requests for forged energy than what is
actually needed. The attacker can claim less energy than what
a node can provide, or claim more energy than required, or
a combination of both. When false energy is claimed, the
process of dividing the grid into smaller micro-grids with
required generation and load capacity fail. This imbalance
results in the disruption of the dynamic partition process and
results in node outages.
Besides energy falsification, other data attack scenarios
against micro-grids have been investigated in the literature.
Authors in [86] analyzed the total load lost due to frequency
dips and system instability as a result of FDIA attacks. In [87],
authors have investigated scenarios where malicious firmware
affect IEDs through a distributed denial-of-service attack. Such
DDoS attacks alter real time active power levels of energy
storage units causing frequency dips. Other attacks against
micro grids involve disrupting the process of distributed load
sharing control leading to instability of the system [91].
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E. Electricity Markets
Electricity market is another area in power system that is
affected by energy forging attacks. Here the objective of the
attacker is to make economic profit from electricity markets
by altering Locational Marginal Prices (LMP). This is done by
buying virtual power at lower prices and selling it at higher
prices [88], [138]. Reference [36] provides comprehensive
review of attacks on electricity markets.
The general structure of the electric market can be explained
briefly as follows [88]: there are two different markets, the
day-ahead (also called the ex-ante market) and the real-time
market (ex-post market). To perform a successful attack, an
attacker first buys and sells virtual power P in the ex-ante
market at different locations j1 and j2 with prices λDAj1 and
λDAj2 . Next, false data is injected to manipulate prices in the
real-time market and the attacker sells and buys the virtual
power P at j1 and j2 with prices λj1 and λj2. The financial
gains by the attacker can be formulated as,
Profit = (λj1 − λj2 + λDAj2 − λDAj1 )P (31)
Different from Locational Marginal Prices, authors in [89]
have discussed false data attacks on multistep electricity
price considering forging power demand by compromising
smart meters ultimately causing customers to pay more for
electricity.
VIII. DISCUSSION
This paper presented a taxonomy of nineteen different
data attacks and discussed theoretical approaches of attack
formulation. In this section, the general structure of data attack
models and numerical software used to solve such models are
reviewed. Emphasis is given on bi-level optimization that is
commonly used to model attack scenarios. Further, discussions
on current global cyber security practise and future research
directions are also presented.
A. Mathematical Structures of Cyber Attacks in Power System
Data attacks against state estimation are launched by ex-
ploiting the null-space of the system Jacobian matrix while
compromising a minimum number of meters. To tackle the
combinatorial problem of meter selection, different heuristics
were considered. In [40], a two level heuristic FDIA model
was proposed where a large network was first divided into
smaller area. Next, brute force search was used to obtain rea-
sonable sub-solutions for each area, which was then combined
to obtain a global attack vector. In [43], linear independent
component analysis techniques were used to infer topology
and states. For FDIA with partial information, authors in [44]
proposed a stochastic convex program that was solved using
scenario generation methods. FDIA against automatic voltage
controller was formulated using Partial Observable Markov
Decision Process [69].
In optimal attack vector designs for load redistribution
attacks, topology falsification and coordinated cyber attacks,
a similar mathematical construction was observed: bi-level
optimization [48]–[50], [55], [56], [60]. Bi-level is a class
of optimization problem where one optimization problem is
nested inside another [139]. The general structure of bi-level
program can be expressed as follows,
minimizex,y f(x, y)
subject to h(x, y) ≤ 0
y = arg min g(x, y)
subject to k(x, y) ≤ 0
(32)
where x, y are upper and lower level variables respectively,
f(x, y) is the upper level objective function, g(x, y) is the
lower level objective function, h is the set of upper level
constraints and k is the set of lower level constraints. The
lower level objective and its constraints together serve as
constraints to the upper level problem. In a bi-level problem,
feasible solutions include those that are optimal to lower level
and satisfy all upper level constraints. The bi-level problem can
be reformulated by replacing the lower level problem with the
equivalent Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions as,
minimizex,y,λ f(x, y)
subject to h(x, y) ≤ 0
k(x, y) ≤ 0
λi ≤ 0 i = 1, ...., n
λiki(x, y) = 0 i = 1, ...., n
OyL (x, y, λ) = 0
(33)
where L (x, y, λ) = g(x, y) +
∑n
i=1 λiki(x, y) is the lower
level equivalent Lagrangian.
In [50], load redistribution attack was formulated as a bi-
level optimization problem. Here, the aim of the attacker was
to inject false data to maximize generation and load-shedding
costs while the operator aimed to reduce operation costs.
Similarly, load redistribution attacks considering resource lim-
itation [55], [56] and attacks against the economic dispatch
[49] were formulated as bi-level problems. In all the above
models, KKT conditions were used to transform the bi-level
problem into a single level problem. Masking of transmission
line outages using FDIA [60] was also formulated as a bi-level
problem. This was further reduced to a single level non-convex
problem and was re-written as two linear programs. To solve
the bi-level program for FDIA on security constrained optimal
power flow, meta-heuristic techniques were employed for outer
level optimization problem and quadrature programming was
used to solve the inner level problem [48]. Cooridnated cyber
attack was formulated as mixed-integer nonlinear program and
further reformulated as a mixed-integer linear program. Due
to inherent non-convexity of lower level problem, a two-stage
sequential approach was used instead of KKT based methods.
In all the above models, commonly used optimization tools
included CPLEX, Gurobi and GAMS.
All the above mathematical formulations demonstrate how
attack vectors can be constructed from a theoretical perspec-
tive. Such attacks, involving alteration of measurements and
status signals, translate to intrusion of secured networked sys-
tems in real life. To prevent unauthorized access, various cyber
security policies for energy systems and critical infrastructures
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have been developed globally. The next sections highlights
major global practices and policies.
B. Global Cyber Security Practise
The United Nations (UN), in its report on Protection of
Critical Infrastructures (CIP), has laid down guidelines for best
practices to combat cyber-security related issues [140]. Some
of the broader guidelines of the CIP include (a) determining
governmental agency responsible for overall implementation
of CIP strategies, (b) risk assessment, identification and mit-
igation, (c) crisis management and developing appropriate
responses to cyber threats, (d) incidence management and
contingency plans for emergency events, (e) identification of
threats at national, sector and company levels, (f) monitoring
of industrial control system and intrusion detection, (g) tech-
nical security audits and (i) training and cyber drills. The UN
Cybersecurity Programme offers technical assistance, capacity
building and resources to nations worldwide for combatting
cyber warfare against critical infrastructures.
The National Cybersecurity Strategies (NSC), jointly de-
veloped by the International Telecommunication Union, the
World Bank, Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth
Telecommunications Organisation and NATO Cooperative Cy-
ber Defence, houses a large number of existing cyber-security
machinery and models [141]. One of the major aim of NSC
is to create a common reference that would serve as a guide
to countries in matters of cyber-security best practices and
strategy development.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) has developed Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP),
11 of which are currently subjected to enforcement [14].
These CIP include (1) categorization of security threats and
identification of adverse impacts at different voltage levels of
the bulk electric system, (2) security management controls,
(3) personal and training, (4) electronic security perimeters,
(5) physical security of cyber systems, (6) system security
management, (7) incident reporting and response planning,
(8) recovery plans, (9) configuration change management and
vulnerability assessments, (10) information protection and (11)
physical security.
The China’s Cybersecurity Law [142] establishes the fol-
lowing major best practices which include: monitoring of
network activity and storage of operation log, assignment of
network security personnel, development of incident response
plan, disaster recovery backup of critical data, remediation and
incident response plan.
To address cyber security challenges in the Indian power
sector, thirty four mandatory requirements (MR) have been
proposed [143]. The MR requires the appointment of a chief
information security officer who is responsible for overall
establishment of cyber security policies. Other MR include
set up of information security department, formulating a
framework for critical information infrastructure, coordination
with National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection
Centre, dependency identification, critical asset inventory con-
trol, creation of electronic security perimeter, incident response
management and security of redundant systems.
The Japanese Basic Act on Cybersecurity and its current
amendment [144], [145] focuses on setting up of Cybersecurity
Strategic Headquarters, monitoring of hostile activities against
critical network infrastructures, cyber-security exercise and
training, promotion of research at national universities, private
sectors and research institutes, development of human re-
sources and fostering international cooperation to successfully
combat cyber crimes.
The Singapore Cybersecurity Act [146] gives the Cyber-
security agency authority to secure government networks,
establish methodology towards cyber-risk management, dis-
cover threats, develop incident response and tackle inter-
dependencies between entities in case of an attack. The
National Cybercrime Action Plan additionally aims to promote
reliable data ecosystem, invest in cyber research and develop
cyber security workforce.
The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) com-
missioned Cyber Security Industry Working Group to de-
velop the Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security Framework
(AESCSF) [147]. The group consists of representatives from
AEMO, industry and government and is chiefly responsible for
developing criticality assessment tool and framework publica-
tion. An upcoming National Energy Cyber Security Readiness
and Resilience Program aims to build a best practise frame-
work for preventing, recognizing, responding and recovering
from cyber attacks.
The African Union Commission (AUC) and Symantec [148]
together put together cyber security guidelines that emphasis
on stringent protection for single-point failures, firewall up-
dates, monitoring network for intrusion detection, protecting
private keys, implementing removable device policy, ensuring
regular backups and proper incident response.
The European Electricity Subsector Cyber Security Capabil-
ity Maturity Model [149] identifies areas of smart grid where
cyber security capability needs to be improved. Some of them
include appointment of a central authority, incident reporting
and information sharing on cyber attack patterns, creation of
a certification board and setting up security standards.
C. Future Research Directions
With a surge in the number of cyber threats everyday,
governments across nations are expanding their budget to
secure their critical infrastructures. There is a rapid growth
in the current market for cyber security infrastructure. Both
public and private enterprises are investing massive resources
to secure smart grid data and network, restrict access con-
trol, identify, prevent zero day attacks and enable smarter
intrusion detection. While a large number of studies have
already demonstrated the potential of attacks originating in
the cyber space and their damaging impact, the future of
cyber security research lies in impact mitigation. This becomes
crucial as attacks get more sophisticated and harder to detect
with existing technologies. Thus, more emphasis should be
given on mitigation plans and how to isolate affected areas
from the power network without impeding reliability. In case
of uncertainties under attacks, robust defense strategies should
be formulated and policies framed that aim to minimize the
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overall financial and social impact of cyber attack on the
electric grid.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a taxonomy of data attacks against
four broad categories of power system operations and control
blocks. Attacks against steady state control blocks affect static
and dynamic state estimation, optimal power flow and security
constrained economic dispatch. Attacks against transient and
auxiliary control blocks threaten the integrity of automatic
generation control, rotor angle stability controls, volt/VAR
operations and FACTS devices. Substation control architec-
tures fall prey to data attacks when PMU/SCADA architecture,
IEC 61850 protocols and circuit breakers are targeted. Data
alteration attacks also target smart meters, load control blocks,
micro-grids and electricity markets. For each category of
attack, mathematical models are discussed. Emphasis is given
on bi-level optimization framework which is commonly used
to construct optimal attacks. Additionally, a chronology of
benchmark research in areas of power system cyber security
attacks and global cyber security policies are presented. All
such data falsification attacks can result in incorrect operator
decisions, uneconomic operations, physical line outages and
voltage collapse, thereby increasing the potential of cascading
failures. Overall, our taxonomy of data attacks provides a
structured approach to help researchers, operators and pol-
icy makers understand the imminent cyber threats faced by
modern power systems.
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